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SOX ON FISH: A NEW HARM OF
OVERCRIMINALIZATION
Todd Haugh *
INTRODUCTION
On November 5, 2014, the Supreme Court heard argument in Yates v.
United States.1 Yates is somewhat of an oddball case. It deals with a smalltown Florida fisherman convicted of the “anti-shredding provision” of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (commonly referred to as SOX), a law passed to curb
corporate malfeasance in the aftermath of the massive accounting
scandals—Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing—of the early 2000s.
However, the fisherman, John Yates, was not found guilty of cooking his
company’s books or lying to his shareholders. Instead, Yates was convicted
of throwing a crate of undersized fish overboard after a federal agent
inspecting his catch told him not to. A jury found this constituted destroying
“tangible objects” as defined under the Act, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. The Supreme Court will now decide just how closely red grouper
relates to Enron in what some have dubbed the “fishy SOX case.” 2 Oddball
indeed.
But as is often true at the Supreme Court, there is more to Yates than
its headnotes suggest. What may have prompted the Court to take the case,
which in many ways offers only a modest question of statutory
interpretation, is the issue of overcriminalization. Overcriminalization is the
proliferation of criminal statutes and overlapping regulations that impose
harsh penalties for unremarkable conduct, i.e., conduct that should be
governed by civil statute or no statute at all. 3 And for the many reasons
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United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. granted in part, 134 S. Ct. 1935
(2014) [http://perma.cc/KM32-D2T Y].
2
E.g., Ellen Podgor, A Fishy SOX Case, W HITE COLLAR CRIME P ROF BLOG (Apr. 22, 2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2014/04/sox -case-is-fishy.html
[http://perma.cc/L9VB-T QDU].
3
Overcriminalization is defined in various ways, but most definitions center on the misuse of the
criminal law and the resulting harms. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and
Overcriminalization: The Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745,
745 (2014) [http://perma.cc/4GZC-RQJR].
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explained in numerous articles on the subject, it is a real problem. 4 Yates
and a host of amici argue that applying Sarbanes-Oxley to fishing is
quintessential overcriminalization, and its evils weigh in favor of
overturning his conviction.
I certainly agree. 5 But this Essay is not specifically about the merits of
Yates. Instead, it is about another harm of overcriminalization, one that has
received little attention thus far. Drawing from the fields of criminology
and behavioral ethics, this Essay makes the case that overcriminalization
actually increases the commission of criminal acts, particularly by whitecollar offenders. This is different from how we usually think of
overcriminalization’s ills—that the proliferation of criminal laws leads to
increasing
and
inconsistent
post-act
criminal
adjudication.
Overcriminalization increases the commission of criminal acts by fueling
offender rationalizations, which are part of the psychological process
necessary for the commission of crime. Without rationalizations, whitecollar offenders like Yates are unable to square their self-perception as
“good people” with the illegal behavior they are contemplating, and
therefore their criminal conduct does not go forward. Overcriminalization,
then, is more than a post-act concern. It is inherently criminogenic because
it facilitates some of the most prevalent and powerful rationalizations used
by would-be offenders, completing the psychological circuit that allows for
criminal violations.
This phenomenon, which presents a new way of understanding the
harms of overcriminalization, is on display in Yates. Therefore, the case—
regardless of how the Court decides it—offers a useful vehicle through
which to explore the full scope of overcriminalization’s detriments.
Part I of this Essay introduces the concept of rationalizations and the
way in which they allow for criminal conduct. Part II shows how
overcriminalization delegitimizes the criminal law, particularly in the
white-collar context, and, in turn, increases the opportunities for offender
rationalizations. Part III then discusses Yates as an illustration of this new
harm of overcriminalization.
I.

THE ROLE OF RATIONALIZATIONS IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIM E

Before understanding how overcriminalization increases criminal acts,
it is necessary to understand how rationalizations affect criminality. While
not receiving much focus in legal scholarship, experts have long understood
the role rationalizations play in unethical and criminal behavior. In the
4
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Ct. July 7, 2014) [http://perma.cc/LS6U-QYRL].
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1950s, criminologist Donald Cressey recognized that criminal behavior
involves “motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes favorable to the
violation of law.”6 Cressey determined that three key elements are
necessary for violations of trust—the essence of almost all white-collar
crime—to occur: (1) an individual possesses a “nonshareable problem,” i.e.,
a problem the individual feels cannot be solved by revealing it to others; (2)
the individual believes the problem can be solved in secret by violating a
trust; and (3) the individual “verbalizes” the relationship between the
nonshareable problem and the illegal solution in “language that lets him
look on trust violation as something other than trust violation.” 7
Cressey believed that verbalizations—what we commonly call
rationalizations—were “the crux of the problem,” because they allowed the
offender to keep his perception of himself as an honest citizen intact while
acting in a criminal manner. 8 Importantly, Cressey found that verbalizations
were not simply after-the-fact excuses offenders used to lessen their
culpability upon being caught. Instead, verbalizations were “[v]ocabularies
of motive,” words and phrases that existed as group definitions labeling
deviant behavior as appropriate, rather than excuses invented by the
offender “on the spur of the moment.” 9 In other words, offender
verbalizations are drawn from larger society and put into use prior to the
commission of criminal acts.
This insight—that offenders rationalize their unethical or criminal
conduct ex ante, which then allows their conduct to proceed—has greatly
influenced the study of white-collar crime and business ethics. 10 It has also
6

Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency,
22 AM. SOC. REV. 664, 664 (1957) (citing EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, P RINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 77–80
(rev. by Donald R. Cressey, 5th ed. 1955)). Sutherland’s book, revised by Cressey in subsequent
editions, is considered a landmark text in the criminology field.
7
Donald R. Cressey, The Respectable Criminal, 3 CRIMINOLOGICA 13, 14–15 (1965). Cressey used
a study of embezzlers to develop his social psychological theory regarding the causes of “respectable
crime.” Id. at 13. His work built on that of Sutherland, whose groundbreaking work introduced the
concept of white-collar crime. While Cressey’s theories have applicability to all criminal behavior, they
have particular force in explaining white-collar crime because white-collar offenders have a “greater
stake in conformity” than other categories of offenders and therefore must rationalize their behavior
through elaborate mental processes prior to committing offenses. Scott M. Kieffer & John J. Sloan III,
Overcoming Moral Hurdles: Using Techniques of Neutralization by White-Collar Suspects as an
Interrogation Tool, 22 SECURITY J. 317, 324 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Michael
L. Benson, Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White-Collar Crime,
23 CRIMINOLOGY 583, 584, 591–98 (1985) (analyzing rationalizations used by four groups of whitecollar offenders) [http://perma.cc/KEM2-RE4N].
8
Cressy, supra note 7, at 15 (describing verbalizations as “ the words that the potential [offender]
uses in his conversation with himself”).
9
Id.
10
See e.g., Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption
in Organizations, ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE , May 2004, at 39, 39–53 (analyzing how organizational
employees perpetrate corrupt acts by using “rationalizing tactics”) [http://perma.cc/AD5V-A3AS];
Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?,
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led to the identification of a host of rationalizations commonly employed by
white-collar offenders. In order to provide a sense of how these
rationalizations operate, below are descriptions of three of the most
prevalent.11 These examples also prove relevant to Part III’s discussion,
illustrating the connection between overcriminalization and rationalizations
through the Yates case.
Denial of injury. One of the most common ways white-collar criminals
mentally relieve themselves of responsibility for their actions is by denying
the injury they will cause.12 This rationalization allows wrongdoers to
believe that no one will really be harmed by their conduct. If an act’s
wrongfulness is partly a function of the harm it produces, an offender can
mollify concern about the morality of her behavior if she believes no clear
harm exists. The classic denial of injury rationalization in white-collar
crime is an embezzler describing her actions as “borrowing” the money; in
the offender’s estimation, no one will be hurt because the money will be
paid back.13
Condemning the condemners. White-collar offenders may also
rationalize their behavior by shifting attention away from their conduct onto
the motives of other persons, a process called “condemning the
condemners.”14 In doing so, the offender “has changed the subject of the
conversation[;] . . . by attacking others, the wrongfulness of [her] own
behavior is more easily repressed.” 15 This rationalization takes numerous
forms in white-collar cases: offenders call their critics hypocrites, argue
their critics are motivated by spite or personal gain, or claim selective
enforcement. Regulators, prosecutors, and government agencies are the
usual targets of such condemnation.
Denial of responsibility. The denial of responsibility rationalization
employed by white-collar offenders is the most prevalent and powerful.
Called the “master account,” this rationalization occurs whenever an
offender defines her conduct in a way that relieves her of responsibility,
thereby mitigating “both social disapproval and a personal sense of
failure.”16 Most offenders do this by claiming their behavior is accidental or
due to forces outside their control, but the rationalization is employed any
time the offender views herself as “more acted upon than acting.”17 White32 CRIME & JUST. 221 (2005) (providing an overview of rationalization/neutralization theory and its
place in criminology).
11
For a more detailed discussion of rationalizations and their role in white-collar crime and
sentencing, see T odd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3143
(2014) [http://perma.cc/ESK2-CF8J].
12
Maruna & Copes, supra note 10, at 232.
13
Cressey, supra note 7, at 15.
14
Maruna & Copes, supra note 10, at 233.
15
Sykes & Matza, supra note 6, at 668.
16
Maruna & Copes, supra note 10, at 231–32.
17
Sykes & Matza, supra note 6, at 667.
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collar offenders may deny responsibility by pleading ignorance, suggesting
they were acting under orders, or contending larger economic conditions
caused them to act unethically. Researchers have found that the complexity
of laws regulating business and the hierarchical structure of companies offer
white-collar offenders numerous ways to deny their responsibility.18
II. THE ROLE OF OVERCRIM INALIZATION IN FUELING WHITE-COLLAR
OFFENDER RATIONALIZATIONS
With that understanding, the harms of overcriminalization may be
more fully appreciated. Overcriminalization’s evils typically have been
viewed through the lens of the enforcement and adjudication of criminal
laws after the offender’s conduct occurs—whether, for example, an
offender was subject to too much prosecutorial discretion or faced disparate
enforcement or punishment. This Essay suggests there is an additional,
possibly more pernicious, harm in the way overcriminalization impacts an
offender’s psychological process before he takes action. That is because
overcriminalization facilitates the rationalizations that allow criminal acts,
particularly those committed by white-collar offenders, to go forward. In
other words, overcriminalization not only causes unnecessary criminal
violations through unjustified enforcement and adjudication, but it also
causes criminal behavior itself. Would-be white-collar offenders draw on
the rationalizations that are created by overcriminalization, and then employ
those rationalizations to complete the critical psychological step that results
in criminal behavior.
How overcriminalization causes illegal behavior is not only a function
of the way in which rationalizations operate, but also of where they
originate. As Cressey explained, rationalizations are not created in a
vacuum; offenders do not invent them in the spur of the moment. Instead,
offenders find their vocabularies of motive within their own environments.
Cressey suggested that rationalizations are “taken over” from “popular
ideologies that sanction crime in our culture.” 19 He pointed to commonplace
sayings that suggest wrongdoing is acceptable in certain situations:
“Honesty is the best policy, but business is business” and “All people steal

18
See, e.g., DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 61 (1964) (with its reliance on lack of intent
defenses, “ [t]he law contains the seeds of its own neutralization”); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A
Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 314 (2009) (describing
“ ambiguous areas of moral wrongdoing sometimes associated with white-collar misconduct”)
[http://perma.cc/GKC5-SEHY]; Benson, supra note 7, at 588 (“T he widespread acceptance of such
concepts as profit, growth, and free enterprise makes it plausible for an actor to argue that governmental
regulations run counter to more basic societal values and goals. Criminal behavior can then be
characterized as being in line with other higher laws of free enterprise.”).
19
Cressey, supra note 7, at 15; accord Benson, supra note 7, at 588 (“[The offender] must bring his
actions into correspondence with the class of actions that is implicitly acceptable in his society. For this
reason, [rationalizations] should not be t hought of as solely individual inventions.”).
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when they get in a tight spot.”20 Once verbalizations such as these have been
“assimilated and internalized by individuals,” they form powerful
rationalizing constructs that allow illegal behavior to go forward. 21
Building on this idea, two other criminologists, Gresham Sykes and
David Matza, found that offender verbalizations originate from an even
more specific location: the criminal law itself. According to Sykes and
Matza, great “flexibility” exists in criminal law; even if a defendant
commits a bad act, he may avoid punishment if he provides a legally valid
justification or defense. 22 Citing defenses to criminal liability such as
necessity, insanity, and self-defense, Sykes and Matza viewed application
of the criminal law as variable, a circumstance they found offenders
incorporate into their psychological processes. 23 Sykes and Matza
determined that most anti-normative behavior was based on “what is
essentially an unrecognized extension of [legal] defenses to crimes, in the
form of justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent
but not by the legal system or society at large.” 24 Put another way, would-be
lawbreakers use verbalizations to rationalize their behavior in order to fit it
within a “defense” to the law that they deem valid, but that society or a
court may not.
If rationalizations are drawn from an offender’s environment, which
includes from the criminal law itself, overcriminalization has a significant
role in creating unethical and criminal behavior. Here it is helpful to more
specifically identify how overcriminalization impacts the criminal law.
William Stuntz, one of the most thoughtful scholars writing about
overcriminalization, found that the overwhelming depth and breadth of the
criminal law has led to two related consequences. 25 First, lawmaking has
shifted to prosecutors. Because the criminal law is so broad, it cannot be
enforced as written; therefore, enforcement on the streets differs from the
“law on the books.” 26 Decisions about enforcement—the “criminal justice
system’s real lawmak[ing]”—fall to prosecutors and police. 27 They make
law through their enforcement choices, not legislatures through traditional
democratic governance or courts through issuing opinions. The inevitable

20

Cressey, supra note 7, at 15.
Id.
22
Sykes & Matza, supra note 6, at 666.
23
Id.
24
Id. (emphasis omitted).
25
Stuntz, supra note 4, at 519. Stuntz identified a third consequence, that overcriminalization
undermines the “expressive potential” of criminal law, but he saw it as flowing from the first two. Id. at
520.
26
Id. at 519.
27
Id. at 506.
21
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result of prosecutor and police lawmaking is selective, arbitrary, and
discriminatory application of the criminal code. 28
Second, prosecutors, not courts, adjudicate crime. 29 With so many
overlapping criminal statutes and regulations to choose from, prosecutors
can charge a range of crimes governing the same conduct. They can charge
defendants with the easiest crime to prove, the crime with the highest
penalty, or—by stacking multiple charges—both. This allows prosecutors
to enforce laws more cheaply, thereby lowering the cost of convicting
defendants, primarily through plea agreements. Prosecutors are “not so
much redefining criminal law . . . as deciding whether its requirements are
met, case by case.” 30 Regardless of the decisions prosecutors make, they are
de facto adjudicating outcomes. This leads to, among other things, the
circumvention of procedural protections guaranteed to the accused. 31
These consequences of overcriminalization are serious in their own
right, but the common thread running through them reveals something more
profound: overcriminalization makes the criminal justice system more
uncoordinated and illogical, more unjustifiable. Whether it is inconsistent
enforcement or overly harsh adjudication, overcriminalization lessens the
law’s overall legitimacy. It is this perceived illegitimacy that provides space
for would-be wrongdoers to rationalize their conduct. They see “defenses”
to the law all around them, which they then internalize and incorporate into
their own thought processes. Once this occurs, there is little stopping an
offender’s future criminal conduct from going forward.
Consider a common “respectable” criminal: the tax cheat. He is faced
with a financial dilemma that can be solved by violating a trust—reducing
the amount of taxes he will pay by failing to report some of his income. He
knows lying and cheating are wrong, and he does not see himself as a
criminal.32 But, if he begins rationalizing his potential bad conduct, he starts
to reconcile the disconnect between his self-perception as an upstanding
person and the crime he is considering committing. For example, he may
think about how complex the tax code is; there are literally thousands of
pages of rules and regulations. Can he really be expected to follow the rules
perfectly (denial of responsibility)? He may also think that all of those rules
28

Beale, supra note 4, at 757–58, 765–67.
Stuntz, supra note 4, at 519.
30
Id.
31
See Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the
Loss of Innocence, 101 KY . L.J. 723, 751 (2013) (concluding that overcriminalization in the white-collar
arena has “ continued [the] deterioration of our constitutionally protected right to trial by jury”); Beale,
supra note 4, at 766–68 (“Overfederalization also increases the potential for duplicative prosecutions
and penalties, reduces political accountability, and risks overwhelming the resources of the federal
courts.”).
32
In fact, he sees himself as just the opposite—a “pillar of the community, a respected, honest
employee” who would “look at [you] in horror” if you suggested he should commit a crime. Cressey,
supra note 7, at 15.
29
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make filing taxes essentially a game that rewards being shrewd (denial of
injury). Even if he did fudge the numbers a bit, he may say to himself that it
is not a real crime—at best it is a regulatory issue (denial of injury).
Besides, the government is so big now it will never miss one filer’s income
(denial of the victim). Even if it did, the government does not deserve his
money—it is so bloated and wasteful, he is not about to contribute to the
problem (condemning the condemners). In the span of a few minutes, the
would-be tax cheat has gone from someone who would never think of
committing a crime to being on the verge of committing fraud.
Importantly, many of these rationalizations are available—or are
available in increased strength and frequency—because of
overcriminalization. The criminal tax code is now made up of over a dozen
broad and overlapping substantive statutes and many more “secondary
offenses.” 33 Further, enforcing criminal tax laws uniformly is impossible.
Only about two percent of filers are audited, and a tiny fraction of those are
penalized—even fewer criminally. 34 This necessarily means the IRS’s
criminal enforcement agents are exercising significant discretion in what
the law is and how it is enforced. This leads to the many consequences
discussed above, including the fostering of rationalizations to be adopted by
white-collar criminals. Overcriminalization, then, fuels an environment ripe
for rationalizations, in turn fostering the very conduct the criminal law
seeks to eliminate.
III. THE ROLE OVERCRIM INALIZATION P LAYED IN JOHN YATES
RATIONALIZING HIS CRIM INAL CONDUCT
Thus far, this Essay has attempted to present a more complete
understanding of overcriminalization’s harms, but in a mostly theoretical
way. However, the facts of Yates provide a ready practical example of how
overcriminalization fuels offender rationalizations, thereby facilitating
criminal behavior. As his case progressed to the Supreme Court, John Yates
made a series of statements indicating that he rationalized his criminal
conduct in numerous ways. Strikingly, some of his rationalizations were
directly related to the overlapping and expansive nature of the law
governing his conduct.
Before addressing Yates’ specific rationalizations, however, some
prefatory comments are necessary. First, despite his blue-collar profession,
Yates clearly fits within the strictures of a white-collar criminal, the
33
John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 609–10
(2005) (defining secondary offenses, such as money laundering and obstruction of justice, as “offenses
that consist entirely of actions that make it more difficult for the government to prosecute other
substantive criminal offenses”) [https://perma.cc/7HJQ-LET 6]. See generally IRS, T AX CRIMES
HANDBOOK (2009) [http://perma.cc/NV2E-AE4E].
34
Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA . L. REV. 1781,
1783–84 (2000) [http://perma.cc/J69J-EHHG].
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category of offender most likely to employ rationalizations.35 Second, Yates
was in a position to rationalize. He was faced with a nonsharable financial
problem—the potential loss of his fishing license for possessing undersized
fish—that could be solved by violating a trust—throwing those fish
overboard after being told not to by a federal agent. The only thing
preventing Yates from committing a criminal act was finding a
rationalization that allowed him to maintain “the image of [him]self as a
trusted person.” 36 Unfortunately, such rationalizations were readily
available.
For example, the most obvious rationalization Yates employed was to
deny his responsibility. Just after the federal agents left his boat, and as he
was preparing to throw dozens of fish overboard, he told his crew that “if
the [officers] wanted to make sure that the fish were still [on board], they
should have put a mark on their foreheads.” 37 This statement is a classic
“vocabulary of motive.” By minimizing his own responsibility—it was the
agent’s fault, not his—Yates was able to look on his obviously improper
behavior as acceptable. This allowed him to keep his self-perception as an
“unassuming, hardworking American[]” intact despite violating a clear
trust.38
Yates also rationalized his actions by condemning his condemners.
During the inspection of his catch, Yates questioned the agent—a Florida
fish and game officer deputized as a federal agent—on how he was
measuring each grouper. 39 He also questioned why the agent was leaving
the undersized fish on the boat at all. 40 This suggests Yates believed the
agent was incompetent or lazy, or was improperly or selectively enforcing
the
size
requirements—typical
condemning-the-condemners
rationalizations.
In addition, Yates relied on the denial-of-injury rationalization when he
argued during the inspection that having a few undersized grouper in his
more than 3000-fish catch was outside of his control. 41 His argument
indicates that he deemed possessing undersized fish to be only a minor
35
See supra note 7. Most obviously, Yates was charged with three white-collar offenses—two
obstruction counts and lying to a federal agent. In addition, he is almost sixty years old, married, and has
a steady job as a boat captain responsible for the welfare of a crew, all factors suggesting he is able to
conform to normative roles and has a self-interest in doing so.
36
Cressey, supra note 7, at 14.
37
Brief for the United States at 7, Yates v. United States, No. 13-7451 (S. Ct. Aug. 19, 2014)
(alterations in original) [http://perma.cc/D6CJ-BFHP].
38
John Yates, A Fish Story, POLITICO (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2014/04/a-fish-story-106010.html [http://perma.cc/D8A6-NVJ2].
39
T ranscript of Jury Trial, Day T wo at 10, 36, United States v. Yates, No. 2:10-CR-66-FtM-29SPC
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2011).
40
T ranscript of Sentencing at 52, United States v. Yates, No. 2:10-CR-66-FtM-29SPC (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 8, 2011).
41
T ranscript of Jury T rial, Day T wo, supra note 39, at 94.
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infraction for which he should not be held responsible. But that thinking
also allowed him to rationalize the destruction of evidence by him and his
crew—a serious criminal offense—as harming no one. This type of mental
progression demonstrates the power of rationalizations.
Although Yates employed a number of other rationalizations during
and after his criminal conduct, these three can be seen as flowing from
overcriminalization. Each one is drawn from Yates’s belief that commercial
fishing and inspection law lacks legitimacy. Throughout his case, including
prior to committing the acts giving rise to his conviction, he questioned the
validity of the fishing regulations and the related secondary offenses with
which he was charged. 42 He also questioned the exercise of discretion by the
government agents and prosecutors.43 And he questioned the criminal law’s
applicability to him and his behavior. 44 None of that is surprising given
Yates’ environment and the legal landscape he faced—a world governed by
multiple laws addressing the same conduct, overlapping state and federal
jurisdiction, overlapping enforcement actors, and incongruous civil and
criminal penalties. This is quintessential overcriminalization, and it aided
Yates in creating criminogenic rationalizations. That by no means excuses
his behavior, but it does provide a new way of understanding
overcriminalization’s harms.
CONCLUSION
It is said that hard cases make bad law. What about odd cases? During
argument on Yates, the Justices struggled with a criminal statute that clearly
did not fit with how it was being used by the government—it was too broad,
too vague, and too severe. 45 That may be enough to overturn Yates’s
conviction, which would be a positive step toward reducing
overcriminalization’s harms. Even so, the case will have little impact on the
“deeply compromised” nature of our criminal justice system. 46 With almost
5000 criminal statutes, and upwards of 300,000 quasi-criminal regulatory

42

Id. (Yates stated, “I believe the agent originally measured my catch improperly and erratically,”
and “ I should have incurred a financial penalty . . . [but] the Department of Just ice wanted a pound of
flesh.”).
43
Id. (“ Nearly three years [after being issued a civil citation], the federal government charged me
with the destruction of evidence—yes, fish—to impede a federal investigation.”).
44
Id. (“ It says something about federal criminal law that it can be used against unassuming,
hardworking Americans for a state civil matter.”).
45
T ranscript of Oral Argument passim, Yates v. United States, No. 13-7451 (S. Ct. Nov. 5, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/F7XR-4SWX]. Nearly all the Justices asked questions concerning the breadth of
Sarbanes-Oxley as applied to Yates, how it interacted with overlapping obstruction statutes, the
harshness of its twenty-year maximum sentence, and the government’s off-balance exercise of its
charging discretion. Id.
46
Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law,
100 GEO . L.J. 1587, 1662 (2012) [http://perma.cc/WVK7-264Q].
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provisions,47 it is going to take a lot more “fishy SOX cases” to remedy the
problem of overcriminalization. Hopefully this Essay will provide yet
another reason to do so.

47
Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a Growing Problem, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 529, 531 n.10 (2012) [http://perma.cc/PG7N-WLY7]; cf. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 513–14
(documenting the parallel growth of the criminal code at the state level).
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